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Firms: Evidence from Upstream-Downstream Relationships  
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Abstract 
This paper proposes evidences for linking innovation and knowledge exchanges in 
developing economies towards a comprehensive theory of new economic geography in the 
knowledge based spatial economy. Firms which dispatched engineers to customers achieved 
more innovations than firms which did not. Mutual sharing of knowledge also stimulates 
innovations. A just-in-time relationship is effective for dealing with upgrading production 
process. But such strong complementarities with partners are not effective for product 
innovation.. These evidences support the hypothesis that face-to-face communication and 
complementarities among production linkages have different roles in knowledge creation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper proposes a new mechanism for linking innovations (product and process 
innovations) and networks in developing economies to identify explicit linkages between 
production and information. It also investigates the empirical implications of this new 
mechanism using survey data gathered from manufacturing firms in four megacities in East 
Asia. Our sampling cities are located in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
We collected firm-level evidence on innovations, linkages between production and 
information, and the respondent firms’ own characteristics using mail surveys and field 
interviews.  
  How do face-to-face communication or tacit knowledge exchanges matter for 
product and process innovation? What are the consequences of frequent communications 
concerning innovation trials? This paper attempts to quantify these questions about 
knowledge transmission in relation to production linkages, so as to lead to higher innovation 
performance. Our estimates will be useful in discussing the impact of small (and 
hypothetical) subsidies for upgrading knowledge-exploiting and knowledge-creation (or 
knowledge-exploring) activities for firms in production networks. Likewise, this paper 
discusses the policy implications of our findings and presents some of the theoretical 
background necessary to evaluate the extent of production-related knowledge in industry 
upgrading. 
 There is a dearth of empirical research that precisely captures the knowledge 
transmission mechanism through inter-firm communication. For example, Javorcik (2004) 
and Blalock and Gertler (2008) find the backward linkages’ impact on productivity 
upgrading for upstream suppliers from MNCs’ customers. There is also a lack of quantitative 
evidence for rigorously identifying the effects of production-related knowledge and the form 
of communications in upstream-downstream relations. Since we need to quantify the 
contribution of production networks to innovation, this paper presents detailed information 
about production linkages, product and process innovation, and the creation of new markets. 
This field survey-based information provides findings that are lacking in previous studies.  
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 The majority of the previous studies on the effects of geographic proximity on innovation 
used the local average of R&D expenditures or the number of R&D engineers as an 
explanatory variable. These studies assumed that all firms in a local area benefit equally from 
the local average of R&D activities. Even if this assumption were plausible on average, it is 
natural that the role of knowledge flows in production linkages and the volume of 
interactions will vary among linkages. That is why we must go beyond geographic proximity, 
collect information about linkages directly, and carefully investigate the effects of each type 
of production linkage on innovation.  
        To examine the role of local production linkages on product innovations, we need to 
identify the extent of companies’ investment in R&D, the exact channels used to upgrade 
existing products, the geographic extent of new market creation, and the emergence of local 
alliances to introduce a new product. We will build a simple model to explain the large 
variation of product innovation across firms with and without R&D activities or multiple 
production linkages. This simple theoretical framework will be based on the reduced-form 
regression model and will provide some interpretations of the empirical estimates of the 
effect of two factors, i.e., the variety of production linkages and engineer-level 
communications, on innovations. Estimating the empirical elasticity of production linkages 
or micro-level communications on innovation will enable us to detect the exact channels of 
process and product innovation as well as the creation of new markets. 
       This paper will investigate the role of production networks in industry upgrading by 
documenting the spatial architecture of upstream and downstream firms in developing 
economies and examining the network effects on innovation. Local network externalities are 
a mechanism for understanding the relationship between production networks and 
innovation. Endogenous growth theory, particularly Romer (1986, 1990), emphasizes the 
importance of innovation in economic growth. However, the internal mechanism essentially 
remains a black box. Lucas (1988) identified local knowledge spillovers as important sources 
of economic growth. Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (1992) showed city-level 
evidence of the role of knowledge spillovers. Conley and Udry (2009) studied the role of 
communication networks in determining the importance of learning from others. This paper 
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is a new attempt to open the black box of local interactions-driven innovation in order to 
detect the knowledge exchanges by using the case of upstream-downstream relations.  
        This paper also focuses on production networks to quantify the extent to which firms 
are motivated to innovate by information flows with customers or suppliers. The lack of 
empirical studies and the potential heterogeneity in production-network availability raise 
several empirical questions about the effects of innovation networks. The specific question 
we are attempting to answer is how production networks affect firms’ incentive to innovate 
when inter-firm linkages become dense. How do firms innovate if communication with their 
suppliers increases? Should firms respond to information flows from their consumers? This 
paper empirically explores these questions.  
 To summarize the above introduction, this paper will present and attempt to explain 
two findings which are basically consistent with the network-based theory of innovation. 
Firstly, firms with face-to-face communications at the engineer level and firms with frequent 
interactions with production partners are successful in implementing innovation, particularly 
organizational change directed towards external markets, and process innovations such as the 
creation of new markets and the securing of new sources of input. Secondly, no matter how 
effective the ‘just-in-time’ system (‘JIT’ hereafter) is in dealing with disequilibria, strong 
complementarities like JIT lead to attitudes that encourage the maintenance of the status quo.  
This paper also constructs a new framework linking product and process innovations 
and explicit knowledge exchanges between firms in developing economies. We assume that 
detailed evidence of production linkages provides information on knowledge exchanges 
between firms and their partners (customers and suppliers). Identifying detailed evidence of 
linkages opens a black box of  the knowledge creation and learning processes among firms 
that are deeply intertwined with internal and international production chains. In particular, 
we construct a canonical model of knowledge exchanges of engineers between firms and 
their partners, and we also investigate the empirical implications of this mechanism using 
survey data gathered from manufacturing firms in five megacities in East Asia. The five 
cities are located in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, and include two cities, 
Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, in Vietnam. We collected firm-level evidence on product and 
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process innovations as well as mutual knowledge exchanges between upstream-downstream 
firms, in addition to detailed information on technology transfer, linkages between 
production and information, and the respondent firms’ own characteristics using mail 
surveys and field interviews.  
 The contribution of this paper lies in its methodologies for detecting the linkage 
impact of innovation and opening up the black box of the endogenous growth model of 
innovation in light of mutual knowledge exchanges between upstream-downstream relations 
in industrial development. Microeconometric evidence suggests that mutual knowledge 
exchanges drive innovation as well as one-way flows of information from partners after 
controlling self-selection (i.e., ‘teachers’ achieve more innovation than ‘students’). Some 
evidence is sufficiently robust to conclude that mutual knowledge exchanges matter. 
 
 
2. THEORY OF LEARNING AND INNOVATION  
 
We discuss herein the reasons why firms with direct information flows, especially 
face-to-face communication and frequent exchanges of information, play an important role 
in achieving product and process innovations. In our empirical setting, we focus on 
exchanges of engineers and JIT information between upstream and downstream firms. In 
particular, compared to firms that do not accept engineers from their main partners or 
dispatch engineers to their main partners, firms that interact with their main partners are more 
likely to introduce new product varieties, organizational changes in response to changes in 
the market environment, and market-based process innovations.  
  
2.1 The Value of Knowledge Diversity 
One reason for the success of firms with different types of linkages is that each type of 
linkage provides unique information about opportunities for upgrading business processes as 
well as about changes in the market. The linkages’ variable is composed of two different 
types of linkages: production and intellectual linkages. The former refers to linkages with 
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several production partners that are located within or between areas of concentration. The 
empirical results also imply that two extremely different types of linkages complement 
product and process innovations. These linkages do not cancel out each other’s contributions. 
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002, 2006), Vega Jurad, Gutiereez-Gracia, Fernandez-de-Lucio 
and Manjarres-Henriquez (2008), Frenz and Ietto-Gilles (2009) clearly suggest that the 
combination of two different sources of knowledge is valuable for innovation. Saxenian 
(1996) emphasizes the importance of information externalities within an agglomeration area, 
leading to a higher cycle of knowledge creation, based on evidence from Silicon Valley. 
Saxenian (2006) shows that Indian or Chinese technicians coming back from Silicon Valley 
combine the knowledge they have gained with local knowledge to create new businesses. 
Jovanovic and Rob (1989) and Keely (2003) provide some microeconomic explanations of 
knowledge exchanges over time. Most recently, Berliant and Fujita (2008) formalize in detail 
that knowledge creation depends on appropriate diversity of knowledge held by two persons.  
 
2.2 Accuracy Arising from Face-to-Face and Frequent Interactions 
Product and process innovations are, by nature, a process of trial and error. One of the 
reasons why many types of linkages and face-to-face or frequent communications are 
beneficial to innovations is that the number of types of linkages is considered to imply the 
usage of instruments that help produce more accurate information compared to trial and error. 
If firms have many types of production linkages or have face-to-face and frequent 
information exchanges, the number and diversity of linkages should insure accuracy when 
firms invest in innovation. There is some literature that focuses on the accuracy of 
information from local interactions across different fields. In the setting of agricultural 
innovation, for example HYV (high-yield varieties), Foster and Rosenzweig (1995) develops 
the Bayesian framework of learning by doing and learning from others in a village, and 
estimates the neighbourhood impact of introducing HYV (which is a risky project in the 
initial stages). They show the significant impact of neighbourhood experience in updating 
information about optimal input volume. In the setting of labour mobility, Almeida and 
Kogut (1999) and Song, Almeida and Wu (2003) empirically show that there is a large level 
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of labour mobility enabled through new hiring across firms within a region and that engineers 
cite patents to other engineers located within the same region. These behaviours within a 
cluster stimulate the acquisition of accurate information from local interactions. On the other 
hand, Berliant and Fujita (2008, 2009) emphasize the dynamic implications of knowledge 
creation based on face-to-face and frequent communications over time.  
 
2.3 Berliant and Fujita in the Setting of Upstream-Downstream Linkages 
We derive the organizational (upstream and downstream relationship) implications of 
Berliant and Fujita (2008, 2009) here. Berliant and Fujita (2008, 2009) build a 
microeconomic model of knowledge creation and study its dynamic implications for 
long-term relationships. Their model rationalizes the optimal level of diversity for 
collaborations. There are two key assumptions: (1) a low level of diversification does not 
create any new knowledge and (2) diversification makes communications costly. These 
assumptions lead to the following three implications. Firstly, knowledge exchanges through 
face-to-face and frequent interactions make two agents homogeneous and efficient at 
communicating with each other. Secondly, cooperation and strong complementarities lead to 
attitudes that encourage maintenance of the status quo. Finally, the knowledge creation from 
frequent communications will diminish over time. We test the implications of this model 
using a setting of information flows from upstream and downstream linkages. 
 Firms with direct information flows from partners tend to be more successful because 
of the value brought by face-to-face and frequent interaction. Accepting engineers from the 
main supplier ensures the transfer of knowledge relating to raw materials, parts and 
components. If the suppliers are based in a more competitive market, the main supplier has to 
pay the costs of knowledge transfer, i.e., dispatching engineers to the main customer. 
Dispatching engineers to the main customer also ensures the transfer of knowledge about 
production processes and market changes. Since it is critically important for firms to acquire 
the most accurate information about market changes, the supplier dispatches the engineers 
from an upstream to a downstream level. The empirical results suggest that there are also 
backward linkages leading to information flows from the customer to the supplier. Because 
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most suppliers are keen to acquire ISO certification to help them expand their market, they 
need to communicate face to face with their main customer to pay the costs of dispatching 
engineers. The JIT system also provides an opportunity for frequent interactions between 
customers and suppliers. Frequent interactions insure the accuracy of information about 
market changes. JIT is effective for dealing with disequilibria. This seems to be consistent 
with Schultz (1975). Although there are benefits from strong complementarities, such strong 
complementarities as JIT lead to attitudes that encourage maintenance of the status quo, 
leading to lower levels of product innovation. We test these implications in Section 3. 
 
2.4 Transferred Technologies and Mutual Knowledge Exchanges with Partners 
Interfirm linkages entail various forms of guidance and learning, such as exchanges of 
engineers. The sources of interfirm guidance and learning may exist in controlling quality, 
costs, delivery, and environment management (QCDE) within the firm as well as within the 
(international) production chain. Such total quality management plays an important role in 
knowledge exchanges between upstream-downstream firms. Not only customers but also 
suppliers give guidance to their partner firms. That is, firms learn about demand for specific 
products from their customers while firms receive technical information from their suppliers 
in the face of new demand. We assume that each firm requires such information spillovers 
through backward and forward linkages to meet the demand. Therefore, information 
exchanges between demand and technologies spill over within the (international) production 
chain. Information exchanges may not take the form of ‘encoded’ exchanges as propounded 
by Polanyi (1966, 1967). More concretely, communication between firms and their partners 
is not transcribed each other when the specific features of demand and technologies become 
complicated.  
 This paper focuses on the interaction of two-way information flows from downstream 
to upstream (backward linkage) and from upstream to downstream (forward linkage) instead 
of examining of one-way information flow. If engineers dispense their professional 
knowledge about production processes, then accepting engineers from partners would appear 
to be a learning activity for respondent firms, while dispatching engineers to partners would 
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appear to be a teaching activity for the firms. If firms absorb their professional knowledge 
from their partners, then accepting engineers from partners would appear to be a teaching 
activity for respondent firms, while dispatching engineers to partners would appear to be a 
learning activity for the firms. To identify which flows are learning or teaching is difficult 
without direct information about the ‘teachers’ and ‘students.’  Since this paper prefers to 
avoid this identification problem, we assume that ‘teachers’ receive benefits from ‘students’ 
as well as ‘students’ learning about new production process, materials and markets from 
‘teachers.’ We test the implication of this in upstream-downstream relations.    
 
2.5 Managerial Abilities as Technology 
Seminal works presenting recent empirical analyses of management (Bloom and van Reenen 
2007, 2010a, b) have emphasized that differences in management practices play a crucial role 
in productivity dispersion within a country and across countries. Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, 
McKenzie, and Roberts (2010) also provides experimental evidence of modern management 
practices for productivity upgrading among Indian textile factories. However, they find that 
the treated factories achieve not only productivity upgrading but also greater profitability 
than the control factories in this experimental setting but that it is difficult to identify the 
impact of adoption of modern management practices and changing managerial abilities of 
managers. We test this by focusing on the background of top management. 
 
 
3 EVIDENCE OF LEARNING FROM PARTNERS 
 
3.1 Data 
A. Sampling 
We used the dataset from the Establishment Survey on Innovation and Production Network 
for selected manufacturing firms in four countries in East Asia. We created this dataset in 
December 2008 in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. The sample population 
is restricted to selected manufacturing hubs in each country (JABODETABEK area, i.e., 
 92 
Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi for Indonesia; CALABARZON area, i.e., 
Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, Rizal and Quezon for the Philippines; Greater Bangkok area for 
Thailand; and Hanoi area for Vietnam). A total of 600 firms agreed to participate in the 
survey: (1) 149 firms in Indonesia, (2) 203 firms in the Philippines, (3) 112 firms in Thailand 
and (4) 137 firms in Vietnam.  
 The sample industries consist of 17 manufacturers in each country. Since the 
aggregate composition of industries is different among the four countries, we focused on just 
three major industries in each of the four countries: food processing, apparel and wood 
products for Indonesia; food processing, apparel and electronics for the Philippines; food 
processing, apparel and chemical products for Thailand; chemical products, machinery and 
electronics for Vietnam.  
 
B. Firm characteristics  
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the main variables. The average age of a firm is 14 
years, with a standard deviation of 12 years. Firm size is also widely dispersed. The average 
size is 293 employees, with a standard deviation of 456. Since our sampling strategy covers 
all of the manufacturing in each country, some firms have more than 2,000 employees while 
some firms are very small, with fewer than 20 employees. Of the total number surveyed, 
approximately 60% are local firms; 13%, joint-venture firms; and 25%, MNEs.  
 Firm function is classified into one of five categories here. Forty-six percent of the 
firms process raw materials. Twenty-eight percent produce components and parts, while 71% 
produce final goods. A total of 24% procure raw materials, while 43% carry out marketing 
activities. 
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics of Firm Characteristics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 14.202 12.392 0 80
Full-time Employees 293.879 456.483 10 2000
Local Firms 0.617 0.487 0 1
Joint Venture Firms 0.132 0.339 0 1
Multinational Enterprises 0.251 0.434 0 1
Production (raw material processing) 0.463 0.499 0 1
Production (components and parts) 0.281 0.450 0 1
Production (final products) 0.712 0.453 0 1
Procurement of Raw Materials, Parts, or Supplies 0.250 0.433 0 1
Marketing, Sales Promotion 0.433 0.496 0 1
R&D Activities (1 if Yes, 0 Otherwise) 0.221 0.416 0 1
Firm Characteristics
 
 
C. Dependent variables 
Tables 2a and 2b present our main interest: innovation. Innovative activities reflect several 
dimensions of industry upgrading. There is no single measure to evaluate the success or 
failure of a firm’s policy in industry upgrading, so we drew up four different groups of 
measures: new goods, adoption of new technologies and organizational structures, new 
sources of procurement, and creation of new markets. We classified innovations into the 
following three categories: (1) product innovation (introduction of new goods), (2) process 
innovations, including adoption of new technology and organizational changes to improve 
product quality and cost efficiency and (3) securing of new customers to sell to and new 
suppliers to procure existing products from, efficiently.  
 While approximately 45% of the sample firms, on average, are able to make product 
innovations in general, it appears that the majority of firms find it difficult to achieve certain 
kinds of product innovations. Only 9% said they were able to introduce new goods to new 
markets, while only 11% were able to introduce new goods using new technology. This 
situation may be due to the higher fixed costs of creating new markets and using new 
technology, in addition to the typical costs associated with product innovations. 
 In contrast, more than 50% of the firms were able to introduce process innovations, 
such as (1) buying new machines, (2) improving existing machines, (3) introducing new 
know-how for production processes, (4) earning certification from the International 
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Standards Organization (ISO) and (5) introducing internal activities to respond to changes in 
the markets.  
 
Table 2a:  Summary Statistics of Product, Process, and Organizational Innovat
Mean Std. Dev.
Product Innovations
(1) Introduction of a New Good 0.458 0.499
(2) Introduction of a New Good to a New Market 0.096 0.295
(3) Introduction of a New Good with New Technology 0.117 0.322
Production Process Innovations
(1) Bought New Machines 0.529 0.500
(2) Improved Existing Machines 0.673 0.470
(3) Introduced New Know-how for Production Methods 0.550 0.498
Organizational Innovations
(1) Adopted an International Standard (ISO or others) 0.531 0.499
(2) Introduced ICT and Reorganized Business Processes 0.342 0.475
(3) Introduced Other Internal Activities to Respond toChanges in the Market 0.597 0.491  
 
 Table 2b shows that firms reported different experiences in the task of securing new 
customers and suppliers, depending on their locations and the characteristics of the 
customers and suppliers. The probability of securing a new local supplier or customer in a 
metropolitan area in which the respondent is also located is higher (63% for securing a new 
supplier and 65%t for securing a new customer) than the probability of securing a new 
supplier or customer outside the metropolitan area (56% for securing a new supplier and 58% 
for securing a new customer). Securing a new supplier or customer in other ASEAN 
countries is more difficult for the four countries involved in the study (325 for securing a new 
supplier and 27% for securing a new customer). Sample firms also found it difficult to buy 
inputs from, or sell products to, MNEs. Only 17% of the firms successfully secured new 
multinational suppliers within the metropolitan area, while only 16% were able to do so 
outside the metropolitan area. Of the two tasks, however, firms found it easier to sell products 
to MNEs than to buy inputs from them. Nearly 30% of the firms successfully secured new 
multinational customers within an agglomeration area, while 21% did so outside.  
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Table 2b:  Summary Statistics of Market-based Innovations
Mean Std. Dev.
Procurement Innovations
(1) Secured a new local supplier (100% local capital) in
survey city
0.636 0.481
(2) Secured a new local supplier (100% local capital) in the
country outside survey city
0.567 0.496
(3) Secured a new multinational company (MNC) (100%
foreign capital) or joint venture (JV) supplier in survey
0.174 0.379
(4) Secured a new MNC or JV supplier in the country
outside survey city
0.162 0.369
(5) Secured a new supplier in other ASEAN countries 0.327 0.470
(6) Secured a new supplier in other countries in East Asia
(China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan)
0.380 0.486
(7) Secured a new supplier in other foreign countries 0.302 0.460
Market-Creating Innovations
(1) Secured a new local customer (100% local capital) in
survey city
0.653 0.476
(2) Secured a new local customer (100% local capital) in
the country
0.580 0.494
(3) Secured a new MNC or JV customer in survey city 0.307 0.462
(4) Secured a new MNC or JV customer in the country 0.218 0.413
(5) Secured a new customer in other ASEAN countries 0.271 0.445
(6) Secured a new customer in other countries in East Asia
(China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan)
0.347 0.476
(7) Secured a new customer in other foreign countries 0.365 0.482  
 
D. Independent variables explaining innovation performance 
Industries in the sample are primarily involved in manufacturing and exporting and are 
currently operating in East Asia. To keep pace with domestic demand and stay on top of 
international competition, the firms adopt new technologies, acquire new organizational 
forms to adapt to market changes, create new markets, find new inputs to improve product 
quality and cost efficiency, and introduce new products. They utilize the external 
environment and local/international markets to upgrade themselves. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to say that they are more likely to adapt new technology and undertake 
organizational changes in response to the external environment and the demands made by 
their respective local and international markets. Forty-five percent of firms adopt the JIT 
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system with their main customer. Thirty-four percent of firms accept engineers from their 
main customer, while 21.5% of firms dispatch engineers to their main customer. On the other 
hand, 36% of firms adopt the JIT system with their main supplier, 27% of firms accept 
engineers from their main supplier, and 17% of firms dispatch engineers to their main 
supplier.  
Table 3:  Summary Statistics of the Relationship with Customer and Supplier
Mean Std. Dev.
Relationship with Customer
1 Main Customer Makes a Customized Good 0.638 0.481
2 Geographic Proximity to Customer (km) 400.069 438.087
3 JIT with Customer 0.451 0.498
4 Capital Tie-up with Customer 0.107 0.310
5 Duration of the Relationship with Customer (years) 6.412 3.489
6 Accepts Engineers from Customer 0.339 0.474
7 Dispatches Engineers to Customer 0.215 0.411
8 Customer is Important Partner for Innovation 0.668 0.471
Relationship with Supplier
1 Main Supplier makes a Customized Good 0.554 0.498
2 Geographic Proximity to Supplier (km) 343.418 413.176
3 JIT with Supplier 0.362 0.481
4 Capital Tie-up with Supplier 0.112 0.316
5 Duration of the Relationship with Supplier (years) 6.233 3.587
6 Accepts Engineers from Supplier 0.273 0.446
7 Dispatches Engineers to Supplier 0.170 0.376
8 Supplier is Important Partner for Innovation 0.117 0.322  
 
E. Production networks in space 
We also focus on two issues related to production linkages between the main customer and 
supplier in a spatial economy: (1) exchange of engineers and (2) JIT. We have two competing 
theories of the spatial architecture of production networks to explain co-location between 
two firms. Firstly, if fixed search costs for production partners (or setup and coordination 
costs of alliances) decrease with capital structure between firms, it is efficient for firms with 
capital tie-ups to form production linkages with their affiliates. Secondly, if communication 
costs for meetings and information exchanges increase with geographic distance between 
firms, the two firms involved will form production linkages that will tend to co-locate in one 
area. Capital tie-up with affiliates is a good proxy for the existence of production linkages. If 
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both of the first and second conjectures are accurate in East Asia, firms with capital tie-ups 
will tend to locate nearer to each other than firms without capital tie-ups.  
That is, the geographic extent of input-output linkage is more locally limited for firms with 
capital tie-ups than for firms without tie-ups due to the needs of the JIT system or frequent 
information exchanges for quality upgrading. This is a transport costs-based theory of 
co-location. This explanation is also derived from standard spatial economy.  Less productive 
firms or less differentiated goods production will forge local or nearby alliances, while more 
productive firms do it globally. For given variable communication costs of alliances, the 
geographic extent of input-output linkages should be ruled out by productivity. If 
communication costs increase, the probability of network formation with remote firms could 
decrease.  
 Secondly, there is the enforceability-based theory of agglomeration. This theory 
emphasizes the monitoring effect of production networks from buyer to seller. If buyers do 
not have a long-term or tight relationship with the producers, such buyers will have to 
frequently monitor and check product quality. The cost of communication is an increasing 
function of geographic distance between buyers and sellers. If this conjecture is correct, for 
example, firms with capital tie-ups need not be co-located because these buyers and sellers 
would already know each other. The geographic extent of input-output linkage is locally 
limited for firms without capital tie-ups compared to firms with capital tie-ups because of 
these monitoring needs. This section answers the following questions relating to production 
networks in space: (1) Are there any differences in the input-output linkages across firms and 
countries in East Asia?, (2) How strong are the linkages between customers and suppliers? 
and (3) Are firms with production linkages also important partners in innovation?  
 Exchanging engineers between firms is also the main proxy for exchanging 
production-related knowledge through production linkages. Table 4 compares the geographic 
proximity of firms that accept engineers from their main trading partners with the geographic 
proximity of firms that choose not to do so with their main partners. The results show that 
firms which decide to accept engineers from their main customers and suppliers tend to be 
located farther away from these trading partners (669 km from customer and 567 km from 
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supplier for firms that accept engineers versus 318 km from customer and 237 km from 
supplier for firms that do not accept engineers).  
 
From Customer From Supplier Variable (km) Obs Mean S.D.
Geographic Proximity to Customer 359 318.5 403.2
Geographic Proximity to Supplier 331 237.6 340.1
Geographic Proximity to Customer 64 319.3 404.1
Geographic Proximity to Supplier 57 368.6 404.7
Geographic Proximity to Customer 23 282.8 389.2
Geographic Proximity to Supplier 23 501.4 454.1
Geographic Proximity to Customer 138 669.4 443.5
Geographic Proximity to Supplier 134 567.0 474.8
Table 4:  Geographic Proximity to Customer/Supplier of Firms that Accept Engineers from
Customer/Supplier
No No
Yes No
No Yes
Yes Yes
 
Table 5 compares the geographic proximity of firms that dispatch engineers to their 
main customers and suppliers with the geographic proximity of firms that do not dispatch 
engineers to their main partners. Firms save on communication costs to remote areas by 
accepting engineers from their main customers and suppliers if these trading partners are 
located far from them. This is also true for firms that decide to dispatch engineers to their 
main partners. By doing so, firms can save on communication costs, especially if the partners 
are located in remote areas (500 km from customer and 348 km from supplier for firms that 
dispatch engineers versus 391 km from customer and 342 km from supplier for firms that do 
not dispatch engineers).  
 
To Customer To Supplier Variable (km) Obs Mean S.D.
Geographic Proximity to Customer 439 391.4 434.3
Geographic Proximity to Supplier 407 342.2 409.5
Geographic Proximity to Customer 48 295.5 397.3
Geographic Proximity to Supplier 41 361.1 418.8
Geographic Proximity to Customer 20 454.0 463.7
Geographic Proximity to Supplier 23 315.8 406.0
Geographic Proximity to Customer 77 500.6 464.3
Geographic Proximity to Supplier 74 348.7 439.9
Yes No
Table 5:  Geographic Proximity to Customer/Supplier of Firms that Dispatch Engineers to
Customer/Supplier
No No
No Yes
Yes Yes
 
 99 
It is natural for firms to create a JIT system with locally concentrated partners. Table 6 
relates the geographic proximity of a firm to its main customer and supplier and the use of a 
JIT system. Firms that have a JIT system with their main customer and supplier tend to be 
located nearer to their main trading partners than firms that have no JIT system with their 
main partners (333 km from customer with JIT and 232 km from supplier with JIT versus 448 
km from customer without JIT and 442 km from supplier without JIT). The formation of the 
JIT system justifies co-location based on transport costs.  
 
Table 6:  Geographic Proximity to Customer/Supplier by JIT with Customer/Supplier
With Customer With Supplier Variable (km) Obs Mean S.D.
Geographic Proximity to Customer 307 448.9 445.9
Geographic Proximity to Supplier 289 442.8 435.4
Geographic Proximity to Customer 71 391.3 442.4
Geographic Proximity to Supplier 45 172.5 341.9
Geographic Proximity to Customer 15 294.6 440.9
Geographic Proximity to Supplier 18 369.2 439.9
Geographic Proximity to Customer 191 333.1 415.9
Geographic Proximity to Supplier 193 232.0 348.1
Yes No
No Yes
Yes Yes
No No
 
 
3.2 Results 
I describe the empirical content of face-to-face and frequent communications and the 
frequency effect of communications on innovations. We report the following internal effects 
of linkages which are useful for understanding the information flow through production 
linkages. Firstly, exchanges of engineers did stimulate information flow due to face-to-face 
communication. Secondly, the formation of a JIT system did provide the opportunity for 
frequent communication between suppliers and customers. Since the last section reports on 
the effect of the variety of linkages on product and process innovations, we relate the internal 
information flow through linkages to product and process innovations. This paper seeks to 
derive the firm’s knowledge production function.  
We set the estimated equation as follows: 
icicicic uxβLINKINSIDEαy ++== _)Pr( 1 , 
where y is the outcome of innovation and upgrading for each firm i located in each 
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country c, the variable INSIDE_LINK proxies the meaning of information and knowledge 
flows between firms (exchanges of engineers and usage of a JIT system), x is other controls, 
i.e., age, size, status of exporting goods to foreign countries, status of importing intermediate 
goods from foreign countries, and country dummy variables, and a cross-sectional error term 
is represented by u. To simply regress innovation outcome to covariates, we focus on the 
estimated coefficient of INSIDE as the degree of innovation management technology across 
firms. 
 Table 7 reports the effects of accepting engineers from customers and suppliers on the 
introduction of new products. The dependent variable is equal to one if each firm introduces 
new products and is zero otherwise. The independent variable, accepting engineers from 
customers or suppliers, is equal to one if each firm accepts engineers from their main 
customer or supplier. Marginal effects are presented. Other control variables are MNEs, age, 
firm size, and country dummy variables. We separately estimate the impact of flows of 
engineers on product innovation by goods characteristics, that is, customized- and 
standard-goods production. As reported in Table 7, the coefficient for accepting engineers 
from suppliers is .329 with a standard error of .105, and it is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Thus, firms that accept engineers from their main suppliers are likely to experience a 
significantly higher probability of product innovation than firms that do not accept engineers 
from their main suppliers. This effect holds true if the main customers and suppliers produce 
standard goods. Overall, product innovation is positively related to accepting engineers from 
the main suppliers and dispatching engineers to the main customers.  
Table 7 presents the innovation impact of dispatching engineers to the main customers and 
suppliers. The dependent variable is product innovation. This is equal to one if each firm 
introduces new varieties and is zero if otherwise. The independent variable, dispatching 
engineers to customers or suppliers, is equal to one if each firm dispatches engineers to their 
main customers or suppliers. As reported in Table 7, the coefficient for dispatching engineers 
to the main customers is .153 with a standard error of .080 if the main customer produces 
customized goods. The coefficient for dispatching engineers to the main suppliers is .248 
with a standard error of .100 if the main supplier produces standard goods. These results 
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suggest that the acceptance of engineers from the main supplier and the dispatching of 
engineers to the main partners are positively important for product innovation.   
 
Probit (Marginal Effects) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variables
Introduction of
New Good
(Yes/No)
Improved
Existing
Machines
(Yes/No)
Adopted ISO
(Yes/No)
Introduced
Internal
Activities to
Adjust to
Changes in the
Market
Accepts Engineers from Customer -0.039 0.050 0.069 0.061
[0.067] [0.062] [0.065] [0.066]
Accepts Engineers from Supplier 0.104 -0.059 0.250** 0.332**
[0.069] [0.065] [0.060] [0.053]
Multinational Enterprises -0.179** -0.219** 0.240** 0.140*
[0.059] [0.061] [0.058] [0.062]
Age 0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Full-time Employees 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Indonesia -0.213** -0.053 -0.361** -0.612**
[0.059] [0.067] [0.061] [0.051]
Philippines -0.068 -0.056 -0.331** -0.370**
[0.062] [0.064] [0.062] [0.066]
Vietnam -0.249** -0.293** -0.270** -0.407**
[0.070] [0.082] [0.078] [0.081]
Observations 587 587 587 587
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in brackets.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The reference country is Thailand. 
Table 7:  Engineer Acceptance from Customers/Suppliers and Product and Process Innovations
 
Let us move to process innovations. Table 8 presents the impact of accepting engineers 
from the supplier on improving existing machines. The coefficient for accepting engineers 
from the supplier is -.140 with a standard error of .081 if the main customer produces 
customized goods. The coefficient for accepting engineers from the supplier is .173 with a 
standard error of .080 if the main customer produces standard goods. The coefficient for 
accepting engineers from the supplier is -.242 with a standard error of .094 if the main 
supplier produces customized goods. The coefficient for accepting engineers from the 
supplier is .191 with a standard error of .053 if the main supplier produces standard goods. 
These results indicate that, if the main partners produce customized goods, it is not easy to 
improve existing machines at firms that accept engineers from suppliers. On the other hand, 
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if the main partners produce standard goods, accepting engineers from main suppliers 
stimulates the improvement of existing machines. 
Table 8 reports the effect of dispatching engineers to the main partners on improving 
existing machines. The coefficient for dispatching engineers to the customer is .139 with a 
standard error of .074 if the main customer produces customized goods. The coefficient for 
dispatching engineers to the customer is .174 with a standard error of .089 if the main 
supplier produces customized goods. The coefficient for dispatching engineers to the 
supplier is .157 with a standard error of .060 if the main supplier produces standard goods. 
Thus, firms that dispatch engineers to customers and suppliers could experience a 
significantly higher probability of internal process innovation, involving the improvement of 
existing machines. In summary, process innovation leading to improved internal production 
efficiency is negatively related to accepting engineers from suppliers if production linkages 
are used to produce customized goods. On the other hand, process innovation is positively 
related to accepting engineers from suppliers if production linkages are used to produce 
standard goods. Process innovation is also positively related to dispatching engineers to 
customers if production linkages are used to produce customized goods.  
 Table 8 presents the effect of accepting engineers from suppliers on firms that are 
endeavoring to obtain ISO certification. The first column indicates that the coefficient for 
accepting engineers from the main supplier is .250 with a standard error of .060. Thus, firms 
that accept engineers from the main supplier have a significantly higher probability of 
becoming ISO certified. This is true if the main customer and supplier produce customized 
and standard goods, respectively. Table 8 reports the effect of dispatching engineers to the 
main customer. The coefficient for dispatching engineers to customers is .193 with a standard 
error of .067, indicating that firms which dispatch engineers to customers have a significantly 
increased probability of becoming ISO certified, which is considered to be a process 
innovation directed towards the external market.  
Making investments to deal with disequilibria is another kind of process innovation. The 
dependent variable is equal to one if a firm invests in internal activities that will help it adjust 
to changes in the market. As reported in Table 8, the coefficient for accepting engineers from 
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the supplier is .332 with a standard error of .053. Thus, firms that accept engineers from 
suppliers are more likely to make investments that will enable them to adjust to changes in 
the market. Table 8 shows that the coefficient for dispatching engineers to the customer 
is .218 with a standard error of .059, while the coefficient for dispatching engineers to the 
supplier is .150 with a standard error of .073. The impact on process innovation of the 
practice of dispatching engineers is higher for firms that dispatch engineers to customers than 
for firms that dispatch engineers to suppliers in the face of market disequilibria or market 
turbulence. In summary, process innovation aimed at enabling a firm to respond to changes in 
the external market environment is positively related to the practice of accepting engineers 
from suppliers and dispatching engineers to the main customers.  
  
Probit (Marginal Effects) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variables
Introduction of
New Good
(Yes/No)
Improved
Existing
Machines
(Yes/No)
Adopted ISO
(Yes/No)
Introduced
Internal
Activities to
Adjust to
Changes in the
Market
Dispatches Engineers to Customer 0.122+ 0.118+ 0.193** 0.218**
[0.067] [0.060] [0.067] [0.059]
Dispatches Engineers to Supplier 0.124 0.115+ 0.087 0.150*
[0.077] [0.065] [0.082] [0.073]
Multinational Enterprises -0.158** -0.237** 0.323** 0.255**
[0.056] [0.058] [0.053] [0.053]
Age 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Full-time Employees 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Indonesia -0.223** -0.062 -0.362** -0.613**
[0.059] [0.067] [0.060] [0.050]
Philippines -0.107+ -0.089 -0.350** -0.399**
[0.063] [0.064] [0.061] [0.066]
Vietnam -0.265** -0.298** -0.213** -0.343**
[0.064] [0.077] [0.076] [0.083]
Observations 587 587 587 587
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in brackets.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The reference country is Thailand. 
Table 8:  Engineer Dispatch to Customers/Suppliers and Product and Process Innovations
 
 Finally, the formation of a JIT system is also a proxy of information exchanges 
through production linkages. Table 9 reports the impact of forming a JIT system with the 
main customer and supplier, on introducing new products to new markets, which is a type of 
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product innovation, or some combination of product innovations and market-creating 
innovations. The independent variables in forming a JIT system with the customer or 
supplier are equal to 1 if a firm forms a JIT system for production and distribution with its 
main customer or supplier, respectively, and are zero otherwise. Column 1 of Table 9 shows 
that the coefficient for a JIT system with the customer is -0.090 with a standard error of .038. 
Table 9 shows that the coefficient for a JIT system with the customer is -0.191 with a standard 
error of .051 if the customer produces a standard product. Colum 5 of Table 9 shows that the 
coefficient for a JIT system with the customer is -0.243 with a standard error of .053 if the 
supplier produces a standard product. These results indicate that JIT with a customer does not 
stimulate the introduction of new goods to new markets. On the other hand, Colum 5 of Table 
9 shows that the coefficient for a JIT system with the supplier is 0.141 with a standard error 
of .069 if the supplier produces a standard product. This result indicates that JIT with a 
supplier stimulates the introduction of new goods to new markets.  
 Table 9 reports the impact of forming a JIT system with the main customer and 
supplier on earning ISO certification, which is a type of process innovation towards the 
external market. The independent variables in forming a JIT system with the customer or 
supplier are equal to 1 if a firm forms a JIT system for production and distribution with its 
main customer or supplier, respectively, and are zero otherwise. Table 9 shows that the 
coefficient for a JIT system with the customer is .245 with a standard error of .100 if the 
customer produces a standard product. The coefficient for a JIT system with the supplier 
is .225 with a standard error of .098 if the supplier produces a customized product. These 
results indicate that firms which form a JIT system with a customer have a significantly 
higher probability of getting ISO certified than firms that do not have a JIT system with their 
main customer. 
 Table 9 presents the impact of forming a JIT system with a customer on a firm’s ability 
to adjust to changes in the market. The empirical question here is whether a JIT system 
provides information flows relevant to market changes or market turbulence. The coefficient 
for a JIT system with the customer is .206 with a standard error of .102 if the customer 
produces a standard product, indicating that the firm which forms a JIT system with a 
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customer has a higher probability of investing in internal activities that will help it adjust to 
changes in the market. Overall, a process innovation that helps a firm adjust to changes in the 
market environment, for example, ISO certification or market turbulence, is positively 
related to operation of a JIT system with a customer.  
 
Probit (Marginal Effects) (1) (3) (4)
Dependent variables
Introduction of
New Good to
New Market
(Yes/No)
Adopted ISO
(Yes/No)
Introduced
Internal
Activities to
Adjust to
Changes in the
Market
JIT with Customer -0.090* 0.122+ 0.117+
[0.038] [0.068] [0.066]
JIT with Supplier 0.041 -0.041 -0.042
[0.045] [0.071] [0.067]
Multinational Enterprises -0.031 0.310** 0.240**
[0.031] [0.053] [0.052]
Age 0.001 -0.002 -0.001
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
Full-time Employees 0.000 0.000** 0.000**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Indonesia 0.030 -0.375** -0.606**
[0.040] [0.063] [0.053]
Philippines 0.002 -0.322** -0.361**
[0.032] [0.063] [0.067]
Vietnam -0.073* -0.149+ -0.269**
[0.029] [0.079] [0.085]
Observations 587 587 587
Notes: 
Dependent variables equal 1 if 'Introduction of new good to new market' is 'Yes'; 0 otherwise
Robust standard errors in brackets.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The reference country is Thailand. 
Table 9:  JIT with Customers/Suppliers and Product and Process Innovations
 
 
3.3 Summary 
The empirical results suggest that firms with face-to-face communication at the engineer 
level and with frequent interaction with production partners are able to innovate successfully, 
particularly in the areas of organizational change directed towards external markets, and 
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market-based process innovations such as the creation of new markets and the securing of 
new sources of input. In particular, however, JIT does not stimulate the introduction of new 
goods to new markets, although it is effective for ISO certification and response to market 
turbulence. In summary, this result suggests that JIT is effective for dealing with disequilibria. 
However, such strong complementarities as JIT lead to attitudes that encourage maintenance 
of the status quo.  
We offer the following three hypotheses as possible explanations for these results: (1) 
Different types of external sources (like engineers from a customer or supplier) and 
combinations of external sources and internal resources provide the value of knowledge 
diversity, (2) Different types of external sources provide the opportunity to obtain accurate 
information about other firms’ trials and errors, for firms without their own R&D department 
or sufficient internal resources, (3) Face-to-face communication and frequent interaction 
with production partners provide a chance to acquire deep and correct information about 
changes in the market and market turbulence. 
 
 
4 EVIDENCE OF MUTUAL KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGES 
 
4.1 Data 
A. Sampling  
Industries in the sample are primarily involved in manufacturing (and exporting for some 
firms) and are currently operating in East Asia. We used the dataset from the Establishment 
Survey on Innovation and Production Network for selected manufacturing firms in four 
countries in East Asia. We created this dataset in December 2009 in Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. The sample population is restricted to selected 
manufacturing hubs in each country (JABODETABEK area, i.e., Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, 
Tangerang and Bekasi for Indonesia; CALABARZON area, i.e., Cavite, Laguna, Batangas, 
Rizal, and Quezon for the Philippines; Greater Bangkok area for Thailand; and Hanoi and Ho 
Chi Minh area for Vietnam). A total of 864 firms agreed to participate in the survey: (1) 183 
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firms in Indonesia, (2) 203 firms in the Philippines, (3) 178 firms in Thailand and (4) 300 
firms in Vietnam. The sample industries consist of 17 manufacturers in each country.  
 
B. Firm characteristics 
Table 10 presents the summary statistics of the firm characteristics. The average age of a firm 
is 16.8 years, with a standard deviation of 13.9 years. Firm size is also widely dispersed. The 
average size is 340 employees, with a standard deviation of 499. Since our sampling strategy 
covers all of the manufacturing in each country, some firms have more than 2,000 employees 
while some firms are very small, with fewer than 20 employees. Of the total number 
surveyed, approximately 67.5% are local firms; 14.5%, joint-venture firms; and 17%, MNEs. 
Firm function is classified into one of nine categories here. Seventeen percent of the firms 
produce raw materials. Forty-two percent of the firms process raw materials. Thirty-six 
percent produce components and parts while 63% produce final goods. In addition to Table 
10, a total of 19% procure raw materials while 24% carry out logistics. Only 2% of firms 
have information technologies departments. Twenty percent of firms have sales departments 
while 40% carry out marketing activities. These variables are not shown in Table 10.  
 The average amount of domestic sales is calculated based on the average number of 
local customers, that is, on average firms have 27.8 customers with a standard deviation of 
25.7. There is a much larger variation in shipping across respondent firms. The average 
product life cycle is 2.9 years with a standard error of 2.2 years. There is also a larger 
variation in the length of the product life cycle. The average number of product types is 6.9 
products with a standard error of 4.2. There are firms with many types of products, while 
there are also firms which produce a single product.  
 Finally, let us turn to the characteristics of top management and worker characteristics 
within the firm. The percentage who hold a master’s degree or higher is 28.4%. Almost 
57.8% of top managers have had experience in engineer during their career. The percentage 
of top management personnel who have experience with multinationals or joint ventures is 
45.9%. The ratio of high school graduates among blue-collar workers is 58.1%, while the 
ratio of technical college graduates among engineers is 50.4%.  
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Mean Std. Dev.
R&D Activities (1 if Yes, 0 otherwise) 0.501 0.500
Age 16.796 13.922
Full-time Employees 340.198 514.347
Local Firms 0.675 0.469
Joint Venture Firms 0.145 0.352
Food 0.111 0.314
Textiles 0.053 0.225
Apparel 0.053 0.225
Wood 0.043 0.203
Paper 0.051 0.220
Chemicals 0.049 0.215
Plastics 0.080 0.271
Nonmetal 0.015 0.122
Iron 0.047 0.213
Metal 0.063 0.242
Machinery 0.063 0.242
Computers 0.023 0.150
Electronics 0.095 0.293
Precision 0.019 0.135
Autos 0.058 0.234
Transport 0.009 0.096
Production (raw material) 0.176 0.381
Production (processing) 0.427 0.495
Production (components and parts) 0.345 0.476
Production (final products) 0.589 0.492
Size of domestic sales 27.833 25.770
Years of product life cycle 2.973 2.254
Number of product types 6.962 4.234
Top management have master's degrees 0.284 0.451
Top management were engineers 0.578 0.494
Top management have experience with MNC/JV 0.459 0.499
Ratio of high school graduates among blue-collar 58.191 27.665
Ratio of technical college graduates among engineers 50.453 36.371
Indonesia 0.212 0.409
Philippines 0.235 0.424
Thailand 0.206 0.405
Hanoi 0.174 0.379
Ho Chi Minh City 0.174 0.379
Table 10:  Summary Statistics of Firm Characteristics
 
 
 
C. Dependent variables 
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To keep pace with domestic demand and stay on top of international competition, firms adopt 
new technologies, acquire new organizational forms to adapt to market changes, create new 
markets, find new inputs to improve product quality and cost efficiency, and introduce new 
products. Table 11 shows our main interest: product and process innovation. Innovative 
activities reflect several dimensions of industry upgrading. There are large difference among 
firms’ policies in industry upgrading. We drew up three different groups of measures: 
introduction of new goods, adoption of new technologies and facilities, and changes in 
organizational structures.  
While approximately 64% of the sample firms, on average, are able to change the 
design of existing products in general, more than 80% of firms improve their own existing 
product. Almost 70% of firms develop a new product based on existing technologies, while 
57% develop a new product based on new technologies. These figures suggest that it is more 
difficult to achieve product innovation in combination with new technologies. Eighty-five 
percent of firms succeed in selling a new product to their existing market, while 71% of firms 
succeed in selling a new product to a new market. These figures also imply that creation of a 
new market is difficult and costly.  
How about process innovations? More than 83% of the firms were able to buy new 
machines. Seventy percent of firms were able to improve existing machines, and 71% of 
firms introduced new know-how in the production method. There are several types of 
changes in the production process, for example, quality, production, cost controls for plant 
operation, marketing, inventory, procurement, and delivery controls for shipping. Firms in 
the sample tend to change their production processes more than their shipping processes. 
There are also several types of changes in management practices, i.e., in the accounting 
system, human resource management practices (HRMP), environment management, and 
adoption of ISO. Changing the accounting system and HRMP within a firm is more popular 
than meeting with regulations and global standardization.  
We collected information concerning not only changes in the production process but 
also concerning ten actual upgrading production processes: (1) decrease defection (72%), (2) 
decrease inventories (58%), (3) decrease materials (50%), (4) reduce the labour input (33%), 
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(5) improve quality (84%), (6) reduce lead-time (50%), (7) increase the domestic market 
(60%), (8) increase the market abroad (35%), (9) reduce pollution (61%) and (10) meet 
regulations (82%). 
 
Mean Std. Dev.
Product Innovations
(1) Change Design 0.639 0.481
(2) Improve Existing Product 0.841 0.365
(3) Develop New Product based on Existing Technologies 0.692 0.462
(4) Develop New Product based on New Technologies 0.573 0.495
(5) New Product to Existing Market 0.845 0.362
(6) New Product to New Market 0.712 0.453
Production Process Innovations
(1) Buy New Machines 0.656 0.475
(2) Improve Existing Machines 0.831 0.375
(3) Introduce New Know-how on Production Methods 0.704 0.457
Change in Production Process
(1) Change Quality Control 0.789 0.408
(2) Change Production Control 0.840 0.367
(3) Change Cost Control 0.801 0.400
(4) Change Marketing 0.745 0.436
(5) Change Inventory Control 0.699 0.459
(6) Change Domestic Procurement 0.495 0.500
(7) Change International Procurement 0.701 0.458
(8) Change Domestic Delivery 0.360 0.480
(9) Change International Delivery 0.635 0.482
Changes in Management Practices
(1) Change Accounting System 0.780 0.414
(2) Change HRMP 0.753 0.431
(3) Change Environment Management 0.671 0.470
(4) Adopt New ISO 0.503 0.500
Upgrading Production Process
(1) Decrease Defection 0.727 0.446
(2) Decrease Inventories 0.580 0.494
(3) Decrease Materials 0.506 0.500
(4) Reduce Labor Inputs 0.334 0.472
(5) Improve Quality 0.838 0.369
(6) Reduce Lead-time 0.503 0.500
(7) Increase Domestic Market 0.606 0.489
(8) Increase Market Abroad 0.350 0.477
(9) Reduce Pollution 0.612 0.488
(10) Meet Regulations 0.825 0.380
Table 11:  Summary Statistics of Product and Process Innovations
 
D. Independent variables: Forms of guidance, transferred technology, and partner’s 
characteristics 
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Firms in the sample utilize the knowledge flows between their own firms and their 
production partners (their own customers and suppliers) to upgrade themselves. Therefore, it 
is reasonable to say that they are more likely to adapt new technology and undertake 
organizational practices such as worker exchanges or technology transfers in response to the 
external environment and its demands. What occurs inside the knowledge flows from 
customers? We have three dimensions of technology transfer: (1) quality control, (2) cost 
control and (3) delivery control. Actually, environment management is becoming important 
in technology transfers between customers and suppliers in East Asia, especially at exporting 
firms. Since only 1% of firms have practiced environment management on their main 
customer, we do not focus on environment management in this sample.  
Firstly, let us describe the proxies of mutual knowledge flows between a firm and its 
customer. We assume that learning and teaching consists of mutual knowledge flows. We 
also assume that this is combination of knowledge flows through engineers, from customer to 
the firm, and knowledge flows through engineers from the firm to its customer. Thirty-seven 
percent of firms engage in mutual exchange of engineers between their own firm and their 
customer. Fifty-four percent of firms receive engineers from their main customer (i.e., 
customer-dispatched engineers). Forty-three percent of firms dispatch engineers to their 
main customer. Total quality management is one of the incentives for mutual knowledge 
flows between firms. Twenty-eight percent of firms are provided with quality control by their 
customer. The customer provides cost control for 7% of the firms. The customer provides 
delivery controls for 9% of the firms. Forty-seven firms provide quality controls to the 
customer. On the other hand, 4.6% of firms provide cost controls, and 14.6% of firms also 
provide delivery controls. Thirty percent of firms in the sample are granted a license by their 
customer. Thirty-six percent of firms grant a license to their customers. Forty-three percent of 
firms in the sample are required by their customers to possess ISO certification. Almost 35% 
of firms require customers to possess ISO certification. Fifty-five percent of firms form JIT 
with their customer, while the average distance to the customer is 448 km with a standard 
deviation of 702 km.  
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Mean Std. Dev.
Customer dispatches engineers*Dispatches engineers to 0.372 0.483
Customer dispatches engineers 0.541 0.499
Dispatches engineers to customer 0.432 0.496
Customer provides quality control 0.278 0.448
Provides customer with quality control 0.473 0.500
Customer provides cost control 0.074 0.262
Provides customer with cost control 0.046 0.210
Customer provides delivery control 0.093 0.290
Provides customer with delivery control 0.146 0.353
Customer grants license 0.299 0.458
Grants license to customer 0.365 0.482
Customer requires ISO 0.433 0.496
Requires ISO of customer 0.348 0.477
JIT with customer 0.553 0.497
Distance to customer 448.736 702.893
Same industry as customer 0.317 0.466
Customer is local 0.600 0.490
Customer is joint-venture 0.161 0.368
Capital tie-up with customer 0.406 0.491
Years of duration with customer 6.699 3.605
Customer's production (raw material) 0.066 0.248
Customer's production (processing) 0.054 0.227
Customer's production (components and parts) 0.133 0.340
Customer's production (final products) 0.433 0.496
Relationship with Customer
Table 12a:  Summary Statistics of Relationship with Customer
 
 
     Secondly, the relationship with the supplier displays different figures compared to the 
relationship with the customer. Thirty-five percent of firms engage in mutual exchanges of 
engineers between their own firm and their supplier. Forty-seven percent of firms receive 
engineers from their main supplier (i.e., the supplier dispatches engineers). Forty-five 
percent of firms dispatch engineers to their main supplier. Total quality management is also 
one of the incentives for mutual knowledge flows between firms and their suppliers. 
Thirty-seven percent of firms are provided with quality control by their supplier. Thirty-five 
percent of firms receive quality control from their supplier. Almost 8% of firms receive cost 
controls from their supplier, while 6.5% of firms provide delivery controls to their suppliers. 
On the other hand, 18.2% of firms receive delivery controls from their suppliers, and 12.5% 
of firms provide delivery controls to their supplier. Thirty percent of firms in the sample are 
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granted a license from their supplier; twenty-eight percent of firms grant a license to their 
suppliers. Thirty-three percent of firms are required by their suppliers to possess ISO 
certification. Almost 44% of firms require their supplier to possess ISO certification. Fifty 
percent of firms form JIT with their supplier, while the average distance to the customer is 
524 km with a standard deviation of 750 km.  
 
Table 12b:  Summary Statistics of Relationship with Supplier
Mean Std. Dev.
Supplier dispatches engineers*Dispatches engineers to 0.359 0.480
Supplier dispatches engineers 0.476 0.500
Dispatches engineers to supplier 0.459 0.499
Supplier provides quality control 0.358 0.480
Provides supplier with quality control 0.332 0.471
Supplier provides cost control 0.079 0.269
Provides supplier with cost control 0.065 0.246
Supplier provides delivery control 0.182 0.386
Provides supplier with delivery control 0.125 0.331
Supplier grants license 0.314 0.464
Grants license to supplier 0.287 0.453
Supplier requires ISO 0.328 0.470
Requires ISO of supplier 0.442 0.497
JIT with supplier 0.507 0.500
Distance to supplier 524.855 750.251
Same industry as supplier 0.361 0.481
Supplier is local 0.538 0.499
Supplier is joint venture 0.193 0.395
Capital tie-up with supplier 0.389 0.488
Years of duration with supplier 6.485 3.541
Supplier's production (raw material) 0.454 0.498
Supplier's production (processing) 0.134 0.341
Supplier's production (components and parts) 0.156 0.363
Supplier's production (final products) 0.115 0.319
Relationship with Supplier
 
 
4.2 Results 
I describe the empirical content of exchanges of workers and the contents of technology 
transfer related to innovations. To begin, we report on the internal effects of the determinant 
of product and process innovations in order to understand the knowledge flow through 
upstream-downstream production linkages. Firstly, exchanges of engineers, trainers, and 
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trainees can stimulate knowledge flow through face-to-face communication. Exchanges 
seem to be a ‘vehicle’ of knowledge flows; however, while these exchanges capture the 
importance of face-to-face communication, we are silent about the motivation for technology 
transfer. Technology transfer could require the opportunity for face-to-face communication 
between suppliers and customers. Since our aim in this paper is to focus on the impact of tacit 
knowledge exchange on product and process innovations, we relate direct information flow 
through upstream-downstream linkages to product and process innovations. This paper also 
seeks to detect the firm’s knowledge production function. We set the estimated equation as 
follows: 
iiiii uxγManagerβEngineerExchangeαy +++== _)Pr( 1 ,  
where y means the outcome of innovation and upgrading for each firm i located in each 
country c, the variable Exchange_Engineer proxies the meaning of information and 
knowledge flows between firms (forms of guidance through exchanging engineers, trainers, 
and trainees and incidence of receiving technical assistance), x is other controls, i.e., R&D, 
age, size, capital structure, industry, function of operation, years of product life cycle, 
number of product types, ratio of high school workers, ratio of college graduates engineer, 
and country dummy variables as depicted in Table 1. A cross-sectional error term is shown by 
u. To simply regress innovation outcome to covariates, we focus on the estimated coefficient 
of Exchange_Engineer as the degree of innovation management technology across firms.  
 
A. Product innovations 
Table 4 reports the effects of exchanges of engineers between a firm and its partners (main 
customers and suppliers) on the introduction of new products. The dependent variable is 
equal to one if each firm achieves product innovations and is zero otherwise. We have six 
different types of product innovations: (1) change design, (2) improvement of existing 
product, (3) development of new product based on existing technologies, (4) development of 
new product based on new technologies, (5) new product to existing market and (6) new 
product to new market. The independent variable, the R&D activities dummy which signifies 
incurred R&D expenditure and country dummy variables are also shown. The variable for 
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customer (supplier) dispatch engineers is equal to one if each firm accepts engineers from 
their main customer (supplier). The variable for dispatch engineers and trainees to customer 
(supplier) is equal to one if each firm dispatches engineers and trainees to their main 
customer (supplier). In particular, this paper focuses on the interaction terms of 
customer-(supplier-) dispatched engineers and dispatches of engineers to the customer 
(supplier) to study the role of impact of mutual knowledge exchanges. Our theoretical 
framework suggests that such mutual knowledge exchanges with the firms’ partners could 
stimulate the learning and innovation processes at each firm utilizing the production linkages. 
Marginal effects are presented in Table 13.  
As reported in Table 13, the coefficient for R&D activities for development of a new 
product based on existing technologies is .156 with a standard error of .048, and it is 
statistically significant at the 1% level (column 3). The R&D activities dummy variable also 
has a large impact on new product to new market (column 6); the coefficient for R&D 
activities is .137 with a standard error of .066, and it is also statistically significant at the 5% 
level. Thus, firms that do R&D are likely to experience a significantly higher probability of 
product innovation than firms that do not pay R&D expenditures.  
 The first punch line of Table 13 is the coefficient for the interaction term between 
customer dispatches engineers and dispatches engineers to customer. The coefficient for the 
interaction term for development of a new product based on new technologies is .230 with a 
standard error of .129 (column 4), and it is statistically significant at the 10% level. The 
coefficient for the interaction term for new product to new market is .271 with a standard 
error of .129 (column 6), and it is statistically significant at the 5% level. The second main 
result of Table 13 is the coefficient for the interaction term between supplier dispatches 
engineers and dispatches engineers to supplier. The coefficient of this interaction term also 
shows the impact of mutual knowledge exchange with the supplier. The coefficient for the 
interaction term for improvement of existing product is -.154 with a standard error of .085 
(column 2); it is statistically significant at the 10% level. The coefficient for the interaction 
term for development of a new product based on new technologies is -.267 with a standard 
error of .127 (column 4); it is statistically significant at the 10% level. These results suggest 
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that the mutual knowledge exchanges with the firms’ main supplier negatively affect product 
innovations, especially for improvement of existing products and introduction of new 
products based on existing technologies.  
Probit (Marginal Effects) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variables: Product Innovations (Yes/No) ChangeDesign
Improvem
ent of
Existing
Product
Developm
ent of
New
Product
based on
Existing
Technolog
Developm
ent of
New
Product
based on
New
Technolog
New
Product to
Existing
Market
New
Product to
New
Market
R&D dummy (Yes/No) 0.001 0.015 0.156** 0.037 0.072 0.137*
[0.045] [0.024] [0.048] [0.053] [0.045] [0.066]
Customer dispatches engineers*Dispatches engineers
to customer
0.103 0.032 0.038 0.230+ 0.084 0.271*
[0.104] [0.052] [0.125] [0.129] [0.097] [0.129]
Customer dispatches engineers -0.161* 0.018 0.062 -0.196* -0.037 0.013
[0.064] [0.043] [0.087] [0.085] [0.075] [0.110]
Dispatches engineers to customer -0.117 -0.016 -0.140 -0.162 -0.039 -0.334**
[0.084] [0.040] [0.102] [0.116] [0.091] [0.115]
Supplier dispatches engineers*Dispatches engineers to
supplier
0.030 -0.154+ -0.129 -0.267* -0.143 -0.145
[0.113] [0.085] [0.118] [0.127] [0.132] [0.170]
Supplier dispatches engineers 0.062 0.091+ 0.076 0.178+ 0.062 0.100
[0.083] [0.052] [0.089] [0.099] [0.074] [0.115]
Dispatches engineers to supplier 0.036 0.072 0.097 0.288** 0.128 0.237*
[0.081] [0.050] [0.091] [0.099] [0.080] [0.110]
Size of domestic sales 0.002* 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Years of product life cycle -0.013 -0.009+ -0.003 -0.005 -0.008 0.020
[0.010] [0.005] [0.011] [0.013] [0.009] [0.014]
Number of product types 0.004 0.002 0.009 0.008 0.020** 0.017*
[0.005] [0.003] [0.006] [0.007] [0.005] [0.007]
Top management have master's degrees -0.057 -0.003 0.032 0.090 0.057 -0.143*
[0.050] [0.024] [0.054] [0.056] [0.043] [0.071]
Top management were engineers 0.100+ 0.026 -0.004 0.061 -0.023 -0.010
[0.055] [0.030] [0.058] [0.065] [0.050] [0.074]
Top management have experience with MNC/JV 0.076+ -0.033 0.015 0.149** 0.100* 0.057
[0.046] [0.024] [0.051] [0.056] [0.047] [0.071]
Ratio of high school graduates among blue-collar 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Ratio of technical college graduates among engineers 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002* 0.000 -0.002*
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Indonesia 0.095+ 0.012 0.049 -0.041 0.156** -0.053
[0.054] [0.033] [0.086] [0.104] [0.032] [0.102]
Philippines 0.042 -0.025 0.018 -0.028 0.039 -0.222*
[0.061] [0.038] [0.080] [0.089] [0.058] [0.090]
Hanoi 0.113+ 0.028 0.035 -0.122 0.177** 0.188*
[0.062] [0.033] [0.100] [0.118] [0.037] [0.094]
Ho Chi Minh 0.514** 0.114** 0.141+ 0.091
[0.041] [0.030] [0.084] [0.101]
Observations 483 483 483 483 338 338
Notes: 
Other control variables are:  Age, size, local firms, join venture, industry, function dummies.
Robust standard errors in brackets.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The reference country is Thailand. 
Table 13 :  Exchanges of Engineers and Product Innovations
 
B. Process innovations 
Process innovations are decomposed into six different ways of the changing production 
processes: (1) improved existing machines, (2) bought new machines, (3) introduction of 
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new know-how for production methods, (4) changes in quality control, (5) changes in 
production control and (6) changes in cost control. The main explanatory variables are R&D 
dummy variables, the variable of mutual knowledge exchange with the customer, and the 
variable of mutual knowledge with the supplier.  
As reported in Table 14, the coefficient of R&D activities for bought new machines 
is .115 with a standard error of .045, and it is statistically significant at the 5% level (column 
2). The coefficient for R&D activities for introduction of new know-how on production 
methods is .179 with a standard error of .044, and it is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Thus, firms that do R&D are also likely to experience a significantly higher probability of 
production process innovation than firms that do not pay R&D expenditures. In addition to 
the contributions of R&D activities within the firm, Table 14 shows the impact of mutual 
knowledge exchanges with the firm’s main supplier. The coefficient for the interaction term 
for buying new machines is -.390 with a standard error of .119 (column 2), and it is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, the coefficient for accepting 
engineers from the supplier is .160 for buying new machines with a standard error of .055, 
and it is statistically significant at the 10% level in this specification. The coefficient for 
accepting engineers from the supplier is .162 for changing production control with a standard 
error of .074, and it is statistically significant at the 5% level. The coefficient for accepting 
engineers from the supplier (i.e., supplier dispatches engineers) has a positive impact on 
buying new machines (column 3) and changing production control (column 5). Dispatch of 
engineers to the firms’ main supplier also has a large and positively significant impact on 
buying new machines (column 3) and changing production control (column 5). 
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Probit (Marginal Effects) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variables: Process Innovations
(Yes/No)
Improved
Existing
Machines
Bought New
Machines
Introduced
New Know-
How for
Production
Methods
Changed
Quality
Control
Changed
Production
Control
Changed Cost
Control
R&D dummy (Yes/No) 0.005 0.115* 0.179** -0.004 0.051 0.019
[0.026] [0.045] [0.044] [0.029] [0.034] [0.040]
Customer dispatches engineers*Dispatches
engineers to customer
0.067 0.030 0.044 0.067 0.101 0.205*
[0.058] [0.113] [0.098] [0.067] [0.074] [0.092]
Customer dispatches engineers 0.002 -0.051 0.059 -0.063 -0.077 -0.078
[0.048] [0.073] [0.074] [0.047] [0.053] [0.061]
Dispatches engineers to customer -0.022 0.123 -0.042 -0.047 -0.116+ -0.166*
[0.046] [0.098] [0.083] [0.056] [0.063] [0.081]
Supplier dispatches engineers*Dispatches
engineers to supplier
-0.016 -0.390** -0.165 -0.025 -0.216* -0.150
[0.067] [0.119] [0.111] [0.078] [0.101] [0.105]
Supplier dispatches engineers 0.020 0.160+ 0.102 0.091 0.162* 0.092
[0.052] [0.092] [0.084] [0.069] [0.074] [0.078]
Dispatches engineers to supplier 0.029 0.203* 0.085 0.012 0.132* 0.025
[0.044] [0.088] [0.075] [0.051] [0.066] [0.075]
Size of domestic sales 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Years of product life cycle -0.006 -0.002 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.010
[0.006] [0.011] [0.010] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009]
Number of product types -0.001 0.006 0.005 -0.001 0.001 0.005
[0.003] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005]
Top management have master's degrees -0.002 0.082+ 0.046 -0.003 0.050 0.045
[0.026] [0.044] [0.042] [0.035] [0.033] [0.040]
Top management were engineers 0.054 -0.013 0.006 0.043 0.060 0.057
[0.034] [0.053] [0.049] [0.037] [0.045] [0.048]
Top management have experience with 0.004 0.026 0.129** 0.020 0.000 -0.016
[0.029] [0.049] [0.045] [0.032] [0.035] [0.043]
Ratio of high school graduates among blue-
collar workers
0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Ratio of technical college graduates among
engineers -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001*
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Indonesia 0.039 -0.016 -0.037 0.085** 0.064 0.110*
[0.030] [0.088] [0.084] [0.032] [0.045] [0.047]
Philippines 0.028 0.028 0.111+ -0.071 0.000 0.020
[0.034] [0.071] [0.058] [0.060] [0.053] [0.061]
Hanoi 0.074** 0.016 -0.002 -0.122 -0.048 -0.048
[0.026] [0.093] [0.089] [0.099] [0.082] [0.090]
Ho Chi Minh 0.123** 0.149* 0.239** 0.125** 0.193** 0.214**
[0.032] [0.075] [0.054] [0.044] [0.044] [0.050]
Observations 467 483 483 473 473 483
Notes: 
Other control variables are:  Age, size, local firms, join venture, industry, function dummies.
Robust standard errors in brackets.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The reference country is Thailand. 
Table 14 :  Exchanges of Engineers and Process Innovations
 
 
C. Sales, procurement, and management practices 
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Process innovation emerges not only in production processes but also in shipping 
phases (sales and procurement stages) and other managerial operation stages. We recognize 
ten different organizational reforms within firms: (1) change in marketing, (2) change in 
inventory control, (3) change in domestic procurement, (4) change in international 
procurement, (5) change in domestic delivery, (6) change in international delivery, (7) 
change in accounting system, (8) change in HRMP (human resource management practices), 
(9) change in environment management and (10) adoption of ISO. The coefficients for the 
mutual knowledge exchanges for these organizational reforms could be interpreted as 
technologies of learning and teaching processes with upstream-downstream partners.  
 The coefficients for the R&D dummy variables are significantly effective for change 
in international delivery (column 6), change in the accounting system (column 7), and change 
in HRMP (column 8); they are statistically significant at the 1% level. Since these 
organizational reforms appear to be costly activities, only firms with R&D activities can 
achieve these reforms, and firms without R&D activities cannot. The coefficient for mutual 
knowledge exchange with the customer is .263 for changing environment management with 
a standard error of .115, and it is statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests that 
firms which receive the benefits of mutual knowledge flows with their main customer could 
have a 26.3% larger probability of changing their environment management than firms which 
do not receive the benefits of mutual knowledge flows. In addition to the mutual knowledge 
exchanges with the customer, the coefficient for the mutual knowledge exchange with the 
supplier is -.295 for changing inventory control (column 2) with a standard error of .118, and 
it is statistically significant at the 5% level. This is also true for changes in international 
delivery (column 6) and changes in HRMP (column 8). Since the coefficients for accepting 
engineers from the supplier for these dependent variables are always positive, firms which 
accept engineers did receive some benefits from accepting engineers.  
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Probit (Marginal Effects) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variables: Upgrading in Sales,
Procurement, and Management Practices
(Yes/No)
Change
Marketing
Change
Inventory
Control
Change
Domestic
Procurement
Change
International
Procurement
Change
Domestic
Delivery
Change
International
Delivery
Change
Accounting
System
Change
HRMP
Change
Environment
Management
Adopt New
ISO
R&D dummy (Yes/No) -0.044 0.007 0.048 0.066 0.053 0.148** 0.156** 0.152** 0.054 -0.002
[0.038] [0.038] [0.049] [0.057] [0.047] [0.050] [0.054] [0.043] [0.051] [0.055]
Customer dispatches engineers*Dispatches
engineers to customer
0.027 0.114 -0.127 0.161 -0.027 0.142 0.116 0.065 0.263* 0.176
[0.092] [0.091] [0.118] [0.137] [0.119] [0.137] [0.137] [0.099] [0.115] [0.134]
Customer dispatches engineers 0.019 -0.079 0.162+ -0.133 0.038 -0.193* -0.006 -0.083 -0.089 -0.071
[0.066] [0.061] [0.087] [0.087] [0.081] [0.097] [0.095] [0.064] [0.082] [0.090]
Dispatches engineers to customer -0.104 -0.111 -0.013 -0.089 -0.059 -0.051 -0.131 -0.045 -0.068 0.02
[0.076] [0.078] [0.093] [0.118] [0.099] [0.119] [0.116] [0.083] [0.108] [0.122]
Supplier dispatches engineers*Dispatches
engineers to supplier
-0.035 -0.295* -0.110 -0.111 -0.094 -0.222+ 0.018 -0.296* -0.16 -0.007
[0.091] [0.118] [0.113] [0.132] [0.111] [0.119] [0.129] [0.117] [0.118] [0.128]
Supplier dispatches engineers 0.061 0.235* 0.027 0.209* 0.025 0.276** 0.099 0.163+ 0.101 -0.067
[0.072] [0.092] [0.086] [0.101] [0.081] [0.090] [0.099] [0.087] [0.092] [0.098]
Dispatches engineers to supplier 0.033 0.098 0.075 0.009 0.040 0.146 -0.015 0.108 0.014 -0.03
[0.069] [0.072] [0.084] [0.094] [0.084] [0.101] [0.102] [0.079] [0.093] [0.102]
Size of domestic sales 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004** 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002+ -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Years of product life cycle -0.015+ 0.003 -0.019+ -0.022+ -0.015 -0.007 -0.021 -0.016+ -0.033** -0.039**
[0.009] [0.009] [0.011] [0.013] [0.010] [0.012] [0.013] [0.009] [0.012] [0.013]
Number of product types 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.004 -0.002 -0.008 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.001
[0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.007] [0.005] [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.007] [0.007]
Top management have master's degrees 0.080* 0.012 0.015 0.156** 0.026 0.060 0.044 0.047 -0.004 0.143*
[0.035] [0.041] [0.052] [0.060] [0.048] [0.057] [0.059] [0.042] [0.055] [0.057]
Top management were engineers 0.002 0.062 -0.020 -0.016 0.064 0.114* -0.048 0.03 0.093 0.136*
[0.043] [0.047] [0.054] [0.068] [0.054] [0.058] [0.064] [0.050] [0.060] [0.065]
Top management have experience with 0.084* 0.069+ 0.030 0.038 0.008 -0.015 -0.039 0.025 0.107* 0.144**
[0.040] [0.040] [0.052] [0.061] [0.050] [0.055] [0.057] [0.044] [0.053] [0.056]
Ratio of high school graduates among blue-
collar workers
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002* -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0 -0.001 0.001 0
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Ratio of technical college graduates among
engineers
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0 0.001 0 0.002**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Indonesia 0.054 -0.092 0.034 -0.029 0.002 -0.106 0.181+ 0.085 0.016 0.068
[0.056] [0.088] [0.079] [0.101] [0.081] [0.092] [0.095] [0.055] [0.096] [0.097]
Philippines -0.041 -0.070 -0.056 0.045 -0.195* -0.049 -0.049 0.031 0.011 -0.042
[0.059] [0.067] [0.077] [0.091] [0.084] [0.087] [0.093] [0.060] [0.088] [0.091]
Hanoi 0.146** -0.195+ -0.021 0.199* 0.013 0.067 0.174+ 0.049 -0.015 0.093
[0.036] [0.110] [0.100] [0.093] [0.095] [0.114] [0.103] [0.074] [0.115] [0.110]
Ho Chi Minh 0.272** 0.239** 0.322** 0.513** 0.287** 0.013 -0.273** 0.288** -0.098 0.055
[0.042] [0.048] [0.059] [0.062] [0.056] [0.100] [0.102] [0.048] [0.106] [0.104]
Observations 483 483 483 483 483 483 483 483 483 483
Notes: 
Other control variables are:  Age, size, local firms, join venture, industry, function dummies.
Robust standard errors in brackets.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The reference country is Thailand. 
Table 15 :  Exchanges of Engineers and Upgrading in Sales, Procurement, and Management Practices
 
 
D. Total quality management and production processes 
Finally, we show the results of upgrading in the total quality of the management and 
production process. We also have ten upgrading proxies: (1) decrease in defection, (2) 
decrease in inventories, (3) decrease in materials, (4) decrease in labour inputs, (5) 
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improvement in quality, (6) reduction of lead time, (7) increase in domestic market, (8) 
increase in market abroad, (9) reduction of pollution and (10) meeting regulations. The 
coefficients for the R&D dummy variables in these specifications are positively significant 
for estimating improvement in quality (column 5), reduction in lead time (column 6), 
increase in domestic market (column 7), increase in market abroad (column 8), and meeting 
regulations (column 10).  
 The coefficient for mutual knowledge exchange with the customer for increase in 
market abroad is .234 with a standard error of .133, and it is statistically significant at the 
10% level. The coefficients for one-way knowledge flows from the customer, that is, the 
impact of accepting engineers from the customer, are effective for reducing labour input 
(column 4), increase in the domestic market (column 7) and reduction of pollution (column 
9). There is no significant effect from the mutual knowledge exchanges with the supplier or 
from the one-way knowledge flows from the supplier or flows to supplier. 
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Probit (Marginal Effects) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variables: Upgrading Total
Quality of Management and Production
Process (Yes/No)
Decrease in
Defection
Decrease in
Inventories
Decrease in
Materials
Reduce Labor
Inputs
Improve
Quality
Reduce Lead-
time
Increase in
Domestic
Market
Increase in
Market
Abroad
Reduce
Pollution
Meet
Regulations
R&D dummy (Yes/No) -0.017 0.007 0.064 0.038 0.056+ 0.094+ 0.110* 0.166** 0.064 0.074*
[0.044] [0.054] [0.054] [0.049] [0.032] [0.054] [0.054] [0.051] [0.052] [0.032]
Customer dispatches engineers*Dispatches
engineers to customer
0.061 0.282* -0.070 -0.160 0.013 -0.092 -0.171 0.234+ -0.099 0.005
[0.112] [0.121] [0.139] [0.115] [0.074] [0.138] [0.129] [0.133] [0.128] [0.069]
Customer dispatches engineers 0.009 -0.177* -0.035 0.144+ 0.001 -0.036 0.274** -0.041 0.221* -0.015
[0.076] [0.083] [0.095] [0.077] [0.058] [0.092] [0.089] [0.092] [0.093] [0.047]
Dispatches engineers to customer -0.013 -0.095 0.034 0.135 -0.013 0.211+ 0.11 -0.135 0.151 0.051
[0.098] [0.110] [0.121] [0.096] [0.061] [0.118] [0.105] [0.117] [0.109] [0.061]
Supplier dispatches engineers*Dispatches
engineers to supplier
0.034 -0.131 0.008 -0.016 -0.076 0.126 -0.022 -0.016 0.012 -0.067
[0.104] [0.129] [0.127] [0.114] [0.085] [0.126] [0.127] [0.124] [0.118] [0.078]
Supplier dispatches engineers 0.012 -0.023 -0.077 -0.013 0.114+ -0.142 0.082 -0.022 -0.049 0.096
[0.084] [0.098] [0.098] [0.087] [0.067] [0.099] [0.102] [0.098] [0.092] [0.064]
Dispatches engineers to supplier -0.073 0.141 0.147 0.021 0.035 -0.006 -0.069 0.088 0.023 -0.007
[0.079] [0.097] [0.100] [0.087] [0.058] [0.102] [0.087] [0.094] [0.096] [0.047]
Size of domestic sales -0.001 -0.002+ -0.002+ -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002* -0.002* 0 -0.001
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Years of product life cycle -0.022* -0.010 -0.001 0.009 0.001 0.002 -0.023+ -0.038** -0.013 -0.012+
[0.011] [0.012] [0.013] [0.011] [0.008] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.012] [0.007]
Number of product types 0.001 0.008 -0.001 -0.008 -0.006 0.017* 0.003 0.007 -0.002 -0.001
[0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.004] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.003]
Top management have master's degrees 0.073 0.067 0.020 0.090 0.080* 0.085 -0.031 -0.018 0.079 0.009
[0.047] [0.057] [0.058] [0.055] [0.032] [0.060] [0.058] [0.058] [0.055] [0.035]
Top management were engineers 0.037 0.082 0.177** 0.037 0.037 0.165** -0.055 0.065 0.058 0.036
[0.053] [0.063] [0.062] [0.058] [0.039] [0.063] [0.063] [0.061] [0.061] [0.037]
Top management have experience with -0.057 0.028 -0.035 0.036 -0.028 0.041 0.119* 0.055 0.078 0.046
[0.049] [0.056] [0.058] [0.053] [0.034] [0.059] [0.056] [0.055] [0.058] [0.033]
Ratio of high school graduates among blue-
collar workers
0.001 -0.002* -0.001 0.000 0.002** 0 0.002 -0.001 0 0
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Ratio of technical college graduates among
engineers
0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000]
Indonesia 0.206** -0.054 -0.091 0.105 0.106** 0.476** 0.290** 0.107 0.178* 0.091**
[0.041] [0.099] [0.106] [0.097] [0.029] [0.050] [0.049] [0.107] [0.078] [0.025]
Philippines 0.218** 0.107 0.074 0.253** 0.085+ 0.411** 0.167* 0.156 0.334** 0.082*
[0.056] [0.080] [0.089] [0.086] [0.044] [0.077] [0.080] [0.097] [0.066] [0.040]
Hanoi 0.215** 0.015 -0.024 -0.091 0.028 0.243* 0.203* 0.049 0.012 -0.107
[0.049] [0.110] [0.118] [0.090] [0.058] [0.105] [0.079] [0.120] [0.110] [0.094]
Ho Chi Minh 0.185** 0.364** -0.184+ -0.285** 0.046 0.313** 0.462** 0.241* -0.053 0.115*
[0.066] [0.073] [0.101] [0.068] [0.058] [0.097] [0.058] [0.108] [0.101] [0.046]
Observations 483 473 483 483 483 483 483 483 483 483
Notes: 
Other control variables are:  Age, size, local firms, join venture, industry, function dummies.
Robust standard errors in brackets.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The reference country is Thailand. 
Table 16:  Exchanges of Engineers and Upgrading in Total Quality of Management and Production Process 
 
 
4.3 Summary 
First of all, the empirical results suggest that mutual knowledge exchanges with the customer 
stimulate development of a new product based on existing technologies and introduction of a 
new product to a new market. On the other hand, accepting engineers from the supplier 
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stimulates improvement of the existing product and development of a new product based on 
existing technologies. However, mutual exchanges of engineers with suppliers harm the 
above two product innovations. Secondly, the empirical result of on-the-job experience 
suggests that top management with experience with a MNC/JV stimulate development of a 
new product based on existing technologies and introduction of a new product to the existing 
market even when we control for the managers’ educational background.   
 
 
5 THE DETERMINANTS OF KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGES 
 
5.1 The Impact of Transferred Technologies from Partners 
Table 17 suggests that there is concrete evidence for the impact of technology transfer on  the 
determinants of mutual exchanges of engineers. As shown in columns 1 to 5 of Table 17, the 
coefficient of the R&D dummy variables play an important role as determinants of mutual 
knowledge flows with the firm’s main customer or main supplier. We find that five main 
results determine mutual knowledge exchanges in the margin of transferred technologies. 
The first result is related to the impact of quality controls. The several coefficients for 
dummy variables when the partner provides quality controls also showed a positive impact 
on determining the mutual knowledge flows with the supplier after controlling not only for 
the supplier’s characteristics but also controlling for the firm’s characteristics. The second 
result concerns the impact of cost controls. The several coefficients for dummy variables 
when the partner provides cost controls showed a positive impact on determining the mutual 
knowledge flows with the customer and with the supplier. The third result shows that the 
delivery management system also determines the mutual exchanges of engineers. The 
coefficient for the dummy variable when the supplier provides delivery controls has a 
significantly positive impact on mutual exchanges of engineers with the supplier. On the 
other hand, the coefficient for the dummy variable when the firm provides delivery controls 
to their main customer has a significantly positive impact on mutual exchanges of engineers 
with the customer. Fourthly, licensing from the supplier also determines the mutual 
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exchanges of engineers. The coefficient for the dummy variable when the supplier grants 
licenses for mutual exchanges of engineers could be .250 with a standard error of .079. 
Finally, ISO determines mutual exchanges of knowledge. The coefficient for the dummy 
variable when the customer requires ISO is .125 with a standard error of .066. In summary, if 
the customer provides cost and delivery controls as well as licenses to the firm, the 
propensity for mutual exchanges of engineers with the customer increases. We should 
emphasize that if the customer requires ISO, then the propensity for mutual exchanges of 
engineers with the customer increases. If the supplier provides quality, cost and delivery 
controls as well as licenses, then the propensity for mutual exchanges of engineers with the 
supplier also increases.  
 
5.2 The Impact of Spacing  
Table 17 also suggests that JIT does not have a significant impact as one determinant of 
mutual exchanges of engineers. However, the coefficients of JIT with the supplier are 
negative for mutual exchanges of engineers in all specifications, and standard errors are large. 
That is, JIT with the supplier does not have a significant impact on the two-way flow of 
engineers. Distance to the customer also does not determine the mutual exchanges of 
engineers. Firms and their customers do not care about the distance between them when it 
comes to mutual exchanges of engineers. On the other hand, however, the coefficient of 
distance with the supplier is smaller than other explanatory variables such as R&D and 
transferred technologies, and it is significantly positive at the 1% level.  
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Probit (Marginal Effects) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variables: Customer (Supplier)
dispatches engineers*Dispatches engineers
to customer (supplier)
R&D dummy (Yes/No) 0.147** 0.131** 0.130* 0.112** 0.102** 0.087
[0.036] [0.038] [0.063] [0.036] [0.039] [0.058]
Partner Provides Quality Controls 0.161** 0.160** 0.092 0.206** 0.233** 0.306**
[0.048] [0.050] [0.076] [0.052] [0.055] [0.080]
Provides Quality Controls to Partner 0.099* 0.099* 0.071 0.025 0.007 -0.039
[0.044] [0.047] [0.078] [0.048] [0.051] [0.072]
Partner Provides Cost Controls 0.164* 0.132 0.189+ 0.212** 0.233** 0.320**
[0.080] [0.083] [0.112] [0.081] [0.084] [0.113]
Provides Cost Controls to Partner -0.056 -0.055 -0.255* -0.025 -0.077 -0.162
[0.094] [0.103] [0.110] [0.081] [0.083] [0.103]
Partner Provides Delivery Controls -0.027 -0.023 -0.027 0.128* 0.150* 0.247**
[0.063] [0.067] [0.108] [0.063] [0.067] [0.091]
Provides Delivery Controls to Partner 0.161* 0.177* 0.189+ 0.040 0.030 0.121
[0.065] [0.071] [0.101] [0.066] [0.070] [0.104]
Partner Grants Licenses 0.213** 0.209** 0.051 0.313** 0.324** 0.250**
[0.053] [0.056] [0.085] [0.055] [0.055] [0.079]
Provides Licenses to Partner 0.070 0.065 0.162+ -0.034 -0.041 0.038
[0.050] [0.052] [0.090] [0.054] [0.056] [0.086]
Partner Requires ISO 0.116** 0.104* 0.125+ 0.199** 0.226** 0.099
[0.043] [0.045] [0.066] [0.057] [0.061] [0.083]
Requires ISO of Partner 0.093+ 0.054 -0.013 -0.028 -0.048 -0.084
[0.049] [0.052] [0.080] [0.049] [0.052] [0.071]
JIT with Partner 0.026 0.014 0.058 -0.027 -0.033 -0.049
[0.043] [0.047] [0.071] [0.038] [0.041] [0.060]
Distance to Partner 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Partner Belongs to Same Industry 0.044 0.048 -0.012 0.047
[0.043] [0.066] [0.039] [0.058]
Partner is Local -0.083 -0.012 -0.057 -0.190*
[0.057] [0.095] [0.052] [0.077]
Partner is Joint Venture 0.052 0.060 0.001 -0.115
[0.065] [0.098] [0.059] [0.080]
Capital Tie-up with Partner 0.044 0.049 -0.081+ -0.138*
[0.044] [0.064] [0.046] [0.067]
Years of Duration with Partner 0.008 0.012 -0.003 0.005
[0.006] [0.010] [0.006] [0.009]
Indonesia -0.086 -0.111+ -0.129 -0.131* -0.179** -0.108
[0.055] [0.062] [0.126] [0.052] [0.056] [0.112]
Philippines 0.082 0.028 -0.023 0.087 0.020 0.065
[0.058] [0.066] [0.110] [0.055] [0.061] [0.109]
Hanoi 0.185** 0.208** 0.201 0.205** 0.154* 0.004
[0.067] [0.078] [0.138] [0.067] [0.076] [0.132]
Ho Chi Minh 0.631** 0.587** 0.470** 0.422** 0.399** 0.198
[0.047] [0.059] [0.106] [0.070] [0.079] [0.132]
Partner's Control ü ü ü ü
Firm's Control ü ü
Observations 864 813 470 864 794 468
Notes: 
Robust standard errors in brackets.
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
The reference country is Thailand. 
Table 17:  The Determinants of Mutual Exchanges of Engineers
Partner is Customer Partner is Supplier
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
In East Asia, a complex production network has been constructed utilizing wage disparity 
and lower transportation costs across countries in the region. Lower transportation costs 
between regions foster the fragmentation of production processes over borders. In particular, 
the intermediate process is more complex, more skill intensive, and higher paid, while the 
final process is easier to build, more unskilled-labour intensive, and lower paid. On the other 
hand, since both inter-firm supplier-customer relationships and intra-firm upstream and 
downstream processes face higher transportation costs, firms with capital tie-ups with their 
main trading partners tend to co-locate near one another.  
 From the viewpoint of spatial economy, it is unclear whether geographic proximity 
between firms tends to spur knowledge transfer between upstream and downstream 
processes within a concentrated area. On the one hand, co-location stimulates frequent 
communication between firms. On the other hand, the exchanges of engineers (dispatching 
of workers to partners and accepting of workers from partners) between firms was shown to 
be more frequent for firms located in remote areas than nearer their main trading partners. 
Empirical work was needed to provide a solution, so to detect the origin and destination of 
knowledge flows between upstream and downstream processes, we collected information on 
exchanges of engineers and implementation of the JIT system to estimate the strength of ties. 
The empirical results suggest that firms with face-to-face communication at the engineer 
level and with frequent interaction with production partners are able to innovate successfully, 
particularly in the areas of organizational change directed towards external markets and in 
market-based process innovations such as the creation of new markets and securing of new 
sources of input. In particular, however, JIT does not stimulate the introduction of new goods 
to new markets, although it is effective for ISO certification and response to market 
turbulence. In summary, this result suggests that JIT is effective for dealing with disequilibria. 
However, such strong complementarities as JIT lead to attitudes that encourage maintenance 
of the status quo.  
The empirical results concerning two-way knowledge flows suggest that mutual 
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(face-to-face) knowledge exchanges have a significant impact on product innovations. 
Managerial experience with foreign firms is as a technology to do knowledge creation for 
firms. Finally, technology transfer requires face-to-face and two-way flows of knowledge.  
We offer the following three hypotheses as possible explanations for these results: (1) 
Different types of external sources (such as engineers from the customer or supplier) and 
combinations of external sources and internal resources provide the value of knowledge 
diversity, (2) Different types of external sources provide the opportunity to obtain accurate 
information about other firms’ trials and errors, for firms without their own R&D department 
or sufficient internal resources and (3) Face-to-face communication and frequent interaction 
with production partners provide a chance to acquire deep and correct information about 
changes in the market and market turbulence.  
Based on these empirical results, we derive two policy suggestions. Firstly, policy 
resources should target firms that have a few production and intellectual linkages, 
particularly small- and medium-size firms in East Asia. Linked firms receive benefits from 
partners while providing important information about market changes to their other partners, 
especially their supplier. It is also important to devote policy resources to the implementation 
of JIT systems. If there are obstacles to implementing a JIT system which will help firms 
upgrade, public assistance can be tapped to create such a network. Economies of network 
based on production linkages could create such externality.   
         Secondly, policy resources should be allocated to the reduction of obstacles that 
hinder exchanges of engineers in East Asia. Since exchanges of engineers occur at the local 
and international levels, (1) ensuring free exchanges of engineers or simplifying immigration 
procedures and (2) creating a common certification for engineers’ skills in East Asia could 
stimulate the upgrading of firms and industries through face-to-face communication at the 
different stages of product and process innovation. 
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